Body Counts -- While Important -- Are Not A Good Measure For Success in Iraq

The Anbar Awakening--which happened long before "the Surge"-- and which John McCain wrongly claimed happened because of "the Surge" was a diplomatic step that brought Sunnis into the political process and calmed tensions. What remains a problem however is that John McCain and George Bush are too narrowly focused on military solutions to deal with what is at heart a political problem. Passage of a fair oil income distribution law, continued incorporation of Sunnis into the army, and assurance that the United States does not intend to occupy the country with permanent bases are all steps that must be taken to help bring the country together. Failing to accomplish these and other important political goals will mean continued resistance in the country. This is already on the verge of happening with the Maliki government's attempts to stop incorporating the awakening councils into the Iraqi army:

DENVER -- Despite optimistic forecasts with Ken Pollack and Michael O'Hanlon in their latest Foreign Affairs piece, Stephen Biddle seems to be parting ways and concluding that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government has no intention of folding in the Sunni Awakening Councils into the Iraqi military. Yesterday's LA Times reports:

Amid fears that the Sunnis' treatment could rekindle Iraq's insurgency, the Americans are caught between their wish to support the fighters and their stronger ties to Maliki's government, which has challenged the Sunni paramilitaries in recent months as it grows increasingly confident about its fledgling army.

"We want to have our cake and eat it too, support Maliki and the Sons of Iraq. . . . Maliki wants to make that as hard for us as possible. He wants us to choose him," said Stephen Biddle, a Council on Foreign Relations defense expert who has served as an advisor on strategy to Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq. "What it looks like we are getting is a Maliki government that won't behave itself and wants to crush the Sons of Iraq."

This is confirmed by a series of other reports filed on the ground including experts like Colin Kahl of CNAS who is also reconsidering his former optimism on the subject.

"There's even some evidence that [al-Maliki] wants to start a fight with the Sons of Iraq," said Kahl. "Al-Maliki doesn't believe he has to accommodate these people. He will only do it if we twist his arm to the breaking point."

Kahl -- noting the slowdown in absorption of Sunni militia members into the Iraqi military and the assignment of humiliating jobs to those who were being incorporated into the central government's payroll - stated:

"The last time we humiliated thousands of these guys is back in 2003, and we got the insurgency."

Turns out those who have been warning that sectarian tensions still run deep (even if there's a tactical pause in violence) and preclude the oft-discussed political reconciliation just might be right after all. Most analysts have missed this, looking to problematic barometers like body counts and the passage of central government legislation despite huge implementation gaps.

All this to say that it is only with increased diplomatic efforts that Iraq's problems will be solved.